In 1994 Lai considered higher order derivatives of discrete functions and introduced the concept of higher order di erentials. We introduce the concept of partial di erentials and present attacks on ciphers presumably secure against di erential attacks, but vulnerable to attacks using higher order and partial di erentials. Also we examine the DES for partial and higher order di erentials and give a di erential attack using partial di erentials on DES reduced to 6 rounds using only 46 chosen plaintexts with an expected running time of about the time of 3,500 encryptions. Finally it is shown how to nd a minimum nonlinear order of a block cipher using higher order di erentials.
Introduction
Di erential cryptanalysis 1] was introduced by Biham and Shamir. Lai considered higher order derivatives of discrete functions 6] and the concept of higher order di erentials was introduced. As a special case binary functions were considered, which is relevant for cryptanalysis of block ciphers. The cryptographic signi cance of higher order di erentials was discussed, but no applications given. Knudsen and Nyberg 8] showed that block ciphers exist secure against a di erential attack using rst order di erentials, as proposed by Biham and Shamir. Basic Research in Computer Science, Centre of the Danish National Research Foundation 1 In this paper we introduce the concept of partial di erentials, i.e. di erentials where only a part of the di erence in the ciphertexts (after a number of rounds) can be predicted. We show examples of Feistel block ciphers secure against a di erential attack using rst order di erentials, but vulnerable to a di erential attack using partial di erentials and higher order di erentials, thus illustrating that one should be careful when claiming for resistance against di erential attacks. Finally, we give a method of how to nd a minimum nonlinear order of a block cipher using higher order di erentials.
Di erential Attacks
In this paper we consider Feistel ciphers. A Feistel cipher with block size 2n and with r rounds is de ned as follows. The round function g is g : GF(2) n GF(2) n GF(2) m ! GF(2) n GF (2) where f can be any function taking two arguments of n bits and m bits respectively and producing n bits. '+' is a commutative group operation on the set of n bit blocks.
Given a plaintext P = (P L ; P R ) and r round keys K 1 ; K 2 ; :::; K r the ciphertext C = (C L ; C R ) is computed in r rounds. Set C L 0 = P L and C R 0 = P R and compute for i = 1; 2; :::; r (C L i ; C R i ) = (C R i?1 ; f(C R i?1 ; K i ) + C L i?1 ) Set C i = (C L i ; C R i ) and C L = C R r and C R = C L r .
Traditionally, the round keys (K 1 ; K 2 ; :::; K r ), where K i 2 GF(2) m , are computed by a key schedule algorithm on input a master key K. The di erential attacks exploit that pairs of plaintexts with certain di erences yield other certain di erences in the corresponding ciphertexts with a non-uniform probability distribution. For a pair of plaintexts, which are not discarded by a ltering process, see 1, 2] , one tries for all values of the round key in the last round, if the expected di erence in the ciphertexts occur. This is repeated several times and 2 the most suggested value is taken to be the value of the secret key of the last round. Now all ciphertexts can be decrypted one round and a weaker cipher attacked in the same way but with a smaller complexity. The signal to noise ratio, S=N 1, 2] , is the number of times the right key is counted over the number of times a random key is counted. S=N = jKj p where p is the probability of the di erential used in the attack, jKj is the number of possible values of the key, we are looking for, is the number of keys suggested by each pair of plaintexts and is the ratio of non-discarded pairs to all pairs, see 1, 2] for further details. For our attacks in this paper = 1. If S=N 1 then a di erential attack will not succeed.
Sometimes one also calls the function f, the round function. We adopt this convention for convenience, since it should cause no confusion.
For the remainder of this paper we will assume that the round keys are independent and uniformly random and of size n, i.e. half the block size. The di erence of two quantities is always taken to be the operation for which the di erence is independent on the value of the inserted key. Therefore when considering di erences for the round function f we will write f(x) instead of f(x; k). We will assume that the di erence of two quantities chosen in an attack is the exclusive-or operation, if not stated explicitly otherwise. The complexity of the attacks is measured as the number of encryptions of the full cipher that an attacker has to perform for success.
Partial Di erentials
In a conventional di erential attack on a 2n bit Feistel cipher, a differential is a tool to predict an n bit value of the ciphertext after a certain number of rounds. But as we will show now it is not always necessary to predict the full n bit value. Even a 1 bit value su ces in some cases. A di erential that predicts only parts of an n bit value is called a partial di erential. In 7] it is shown that the functions f(x) = x ?1 in GF(2 n ), where f(x) = 0 for x = 0, are di erentially 2-uniform for odd n and di erentially 4-uniform for even n, i.e. the highest probability of a non-trivial one round di erential is 2=2 n and 4=2 n respectively. In both cases the nonlinear order of the outputs is n ? 1 7] . As an example consider a 5 round cipher using as round function f(x; k) = (x k) ?1 in GF(2 n ) for n odd. From the results of 8] this cipher is highly resistant against di erential attacks using full di erentials, since any 3 round di erential has a probability of at most 2 3?2n according to Th. 2 of 8] , that is, using di erentials, where full n bit di erences are used. In an attack counting on the round key of the last round the signal to noise ratio is S=N < 2 n 2 3?2n 1 1 < 1 for n > 3 and the attack will not succeed. In an attack counting on the round keys of the last two rounds only a 2 round di erential is needed. And since the concepts of characteristics and di erentials coincide for 2 rounds in a Feistel cipher it is easy to see that there exists a di erential with a probability of 2=2 n and that this di erential obtains a maximum probability. The signal to noise ratio is S=N = 2 2n 2 1?n 1 1 = 2 n+1 and the attack will succeed with complexity 2 n chosen plaintexts and running time of about 2 3n . However, for every non-trivial input di erence to one round there are only 2 n?1 possible di erences in the outputs, each one with a probability of 2=2 n , since the round function is di erentially 2-uniform and the exclusive-or operation is commutative. That is, for a non-trivial input di erence we get one bit of information about the output di erences. From this fact we can construct a 2 round di erential of probability one, where only one bit of the di erences after 2 rounds of encryption is predicted. In a di erential attack counting on the round keys of the last two rounds for every pair of plaintexts only half the possible values 4
of the keys will be suggested. We obtain S=N = 2 2n 1 2 (2n?1) 1 = 2 and the attack will succeed with su ciently many pairs of chosen plaintexts. We implemented the attack on a 5 round 18 bit cipher with a key of 45 bits using as round function f(x) = x ?1 in GF (2 9 ). Using 18 pairs of chosen plaintexts in 100 tests only one pair of keys was found, the right keys in the fourth and fth rounds.
The attack can be generalised and the following result holds. Since the nonlinear order of f(x) can be as high as n ? 1, the information about the output di erences we get from a given input di erence is not necessarily easily determined. of the possible values of (RK 4 ; RK 5 ) have been suggested, one of which is the right pair of keys. By repeating the attack su ciently many times only one unique pair of keys, the right pair of keys, will be left suggested. Any other keys will be suggested with probability W for each run of the above attack. Therefore after trying L pairs of plaintexts any key but the right key, is suggested L times with a probability of (W) L and if (W) L < 2 ?2n with a high probability the right keys are uniquely determined. Finally, note that since W 1=2, min L : (1=2) L < 2 ?2n = 2n + 1.
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The attack can be extended to work on ciphers with any number of rounds by counting on all but the rst three round keys. 
Attacks using higher order di erentials
In the previous section we showed how to exploit partial information of di erentials. One may ask the following question: does round functions exist, which does not leak any partial information for any non-trivial di erence? The answer is positive and in the following we give an example of a 5 round Feistel cipher, for which the round function is di erentially 1-uniform i.e. for every non trivial input di erence all output di erences occur exactly once. We show that di erential attacks on this cipher using higher order di erentials are much more e cient than conventional di erential attacks. We generalise the result to any 5 round Feistel cipher. , where '+' is addition modulo p and the di erence of two quantities, x and y, is x?y mod p. f is di erentially 1-uniform, a non-trivial one round di erential has a probability of 1=p. Secondly, the second order derivative of f is constant.
Proof: To prove the rst statement, consider a xed a 6 = 0 mod p. 
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Proof: When doing a di erential attack counting on the round key in the fth round of the above cipher we need a 3 (or 4) round di erential. It is easy to see that there exists a 3 round di erential with a probability of 1=p and that this di erential obtains a maximum probability. We obtain S=N = p 1=p 1 1 = 1 This attack is not possible, since the right key cannot be distinguished from other random keys. When doing a di erential attack counting on the round keys in both the fourth and fth rounds we need only a 2 round di erential. There exists a 2 round di erential with a probability of 1=p, which is a maximum probability for the above cipher. In this case we obtain S=N = p 2 1=p 1 1 = p This attack is possible. We need about 2p chosen plaintexts and for every pair of plaintexts we do two rounds of encryption for every p 2 possible keys of the fourth and fth rounds. Therefore we obtain a complexity of about p 1. Choose plaintext P 1 at random. 2. Set P 2 = P 1 + , P 3 = P 1 + and P 4 = P 1 + + . 3. Get the encryptions C 1 ; :::; C 4 of P 1 ; :::; P 4 4. For every value k 5 of the round key RK 5 do ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( F ? ? h ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( F ? ? h ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( F ? ? h ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( F ? ? ii.
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Here X L and X R denote the left and right halves of X respectively. In the rst round all inputs to the f-function are equal. In the second round the inputs form a second order di erential with (a; b; 2 a b). Since this di erential has probability 1 according to Th. 4.1, the di erence in the four inputs to the third round is ? = 2 a b. Therefore the di erence in the outputs of the fourth round can be 10 computed as the exclusive-or sum of ? and of the right halves of the ciphertexts. Upon termination a few keys will have been suggested, among which the right keys appear, since the two round second order di erential has probability 1. Therefore by repeating this attack a few times only one value of (RK 4 ; RK 5 ) is suggested every time. This value is guaranteed to be the secret fourth and fth round key. The signal to noise ratio of the attack is
where we have assumed that one key in average is suggested by each pair of plaintexts. Now it is trivial to nd the remaining three round keys by similar attacks on cryptosystems with less than ve rounds. As in 1, 2] we can pack the chosen plaintexts in economical structures, thus as an example obtain four second order di erentials from 8 chosen plaintexts.2
If the prime p above is of cardinality, say about 2 25 , according to Th. 4.2 a di erential attack using rst order di erential has a complexity of about 2 75 using about 2 26 chosen plaintexts, i.e. not at all a practical attack. According to Th. 4.3 a di erential attack using second order di erentials has a complexity of about 2 50 using only about 8 chosen plaintexts, a practical attack or at least not far from being one.
The attack in the proof of Th. 4.3 can be applied to any 5 round Feistel cipher, where the round function contains no expansion and where the output coordinates are quadratic, i.e. the nonlinear order of f is 2. Furthermore the attack can be converted into an attack on any 5 round Feistel cipher. For convenience let us now consider functions over GF (2) . We state explicitly the de nition of higher order di erentials for this important case. Proof: According to Prop. 4.3 the r-order derivative of a function of nonlinear order r is a constant. Therefore we can obtain a 2 round r-order di erential with probability 1 and do a similar attack as in the proof of Th. 4.3. in GF(2 n ) for n odd and gcd(k; n) = 1. f is di erentially 2-uniform and the second order derivative of f, ; f(x) is a constant with the value ? = ( We implemented the attack of Th. 4.4 counting on both the fourth and fth round key using second order di erentials in a ve round Feistel cipher with f(x) of Lemma 4.1 as round function and with n = 9 and k = 1, i.e. a 18 bit cipher with a 45 bit key. In 100 tests using 12 chosen plaintexts only one pair of keys was suggested and every time this pair was the right values of the fourth and fth secret round keys. By using quartets as de ned in 1, 2] the number of chosen plaintexts can be reduced to about 8. Note that for this cipher the probability of any 3 round di erential of rst order is at most 2 3?2n 8], where 2n is the block size. Also note that the example cipher of 8] has 6 rounds, and is therefore not vulnerable to the above attacks. DES 9] there are partial di erentials with probability one. When two inputs to the F-function are equal in the inputs to an Sbox, the outputs from that S-box are always equal, independent of the values of the inputs to other S-boxes. These partial di erentials are used to a wide extent in Biham and Shamirs attacks on the DES 1, 2].
The output of an S-box a ects the inputs of at most six S-boxes in the following round, because of the P-permutation, see Table 1 . This fact can be used to construct a four round partial di erential for the DES with probability one, which gives knowledge about the di erence of eight bits in the ciphertext after four rounds. Consider a pair of plaintexts where the right halves are equal and the left halves di er, such that the inputs to only one S-box, say S-box 1, are di erent after the E-expansion. The rst round in the di erential holds always, and in the second round the outputs of all S-boxes except S-box 1 are equal. In the inputs to the third round the inputs of two S-boxes, S-boxes 1 and 7, are always equal, since S-box 1 does not a ect these S-boxes according to Table 1 . Therefore the outputs of these S-boxes are equal, and the xor of eight bits in the right halves of the ciphertexts after three rounds are known, since the xor in the inputs in the second round is known. The right halves after three rounds equal the left halves after four rounds, therefore the xor of eight bits after four rounds of for the 8 S-boxes of DES. encryption are known with probability one. This di erential can be used to attack the DES with 6 rounds in a di erential attack using only a few chosen plaintexts as we will show in the next section. There are other interesting partial di erentials for the DES. Consider a six bit input di erence (xor) to one S-box, x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ; x 4 ; x 5 ; x 6 and the corresponding di erence in the outputs y 1 ; y 2 ; y 3 ; y 4 . Instead of considering all 4 output bits as in traditional di erentials, we consider only one of the y i 's. The probabilities of these partial 1-bit output di erentials in the ideal case will be 1=2. In Table 2 for all 8 S-boxes the partial di erentials for which jp ? 1=2j 20=64 are listed, where p is the probabilities of the di erentials. Note that if p is the probability that an xor bit is one, 1?p is the probability that the bit is zero. As an example consider S-box 2, where an input xor of 20 x leads to an output xor, for which the xor of the second most signi cant bits of the outputs is one in 60 out of all 64 possible pairs of inputs. It is also interesting to note that for the S-box 4, the probabilities of partial 1-bit output di erentials are all between 20=64 and 44=64, i.e. jp ? 1=2j 12=64 for S-box 4. S-box 4 has been the subject of much debate since the publication of the DES and it has been conjectured the weakest S-box. It is 75% redundant, see 3] and it has a strange di erence distribution table (see 1, 2] ). To our knowledge the above properties show for the rst time a case, where S-box 4 is the strongest of the 8 S-boxes. Another interesting property of the S-boxes is revealed by considering pairs of input where the only the two middle input bits di er, i.e. xors 04 x , 08 x and 0c x . These xors are of particular interest in di erential cryptanalysis, since this allows neighbouring S-boxes to have equal inputs, i.e. xors 00 x . For these input xors, the probability that one particular bit in the output xor is zero is at most 36=64 for S-boxes no. 2, 3 and 7. For the S-boxes 1, 5, 6 and 8 the probability is at most 32=64 and for S-box 4 at most 24=64. We can use the above partial differentials to construct a four round di erential, which gives knowledge about the di erence of more than eight bits in the ciphertext after four rounds.
As an example, for S-box 7, an input xor of 04 x will yield an output xor, such that the xor of the second output bits (y 2 ) is zero with probability 36=64. Consider a pair of plaintexts with di erence 00000020 x j 00000000 x , that is where the right halves are equal and the left halves di er in only one bit. After one round of encryption the di erence will always be 00000000 x j 00000020 x . After two rounds of encryption the di erence will be 00000020 x j Y x with probability 36=64, where E(Y ) is di erent in the inputs to only S-boxes 1, 2, 6, and 8. Therefore the outputs of S-boxes 3, 4, 5, and 7 will be equal after three rounds of encryption. In other words one gets knowledge of the xor of 16 bits in the right halves of the ciphertexts after three rounds and therefore in the left halves of the ciphertexts after four rounds of encryption with probability 36=64.
In a similar way, one can use two of the combinations of Table 2 , namely the input xor 04 x for S-box 6 and the input xor 04 x for S-box 3, both with probability 52=64 to obtain a four round partial di erential 15 with probability (52=64) 2 ' 42=64 where the xor of nine ciphertext bits are known.
Note that although the above di erentials can be used to deduce key bits of the DES with 6 or fewer rounds in a partial di erential attack, it is also clear that when considering the DES with more than 6 rounds the method will only work locally in the rst few and last few rounds of the cipher.
Finally we note that in 10] Preneel et al. considered, what they call reduced exors, in di erential attacks on the DES in CFB mode. The reduced exors have some resemblance with partial di erentials.
Attack on 6 round DES.
In this section we consider the DES 9] reduced to 6 rounds. We take the rst 6 rounds of the standard and omit the initial and nal permutation, since they are of no importance for our attack.
Theorem 5.1 There exists a di erential attack on DES with 6 rounds, which nds the secret key using 46 chosen plaintexts in expected time the time of about 3,500 encryptions, which can be done in a few seconds on a PC. Proof: We consider a di erential chosen plaintext attack using the di erential in Fig. 2 and a similar di erential where all the quantities 20000000 x are replaced by 40000000 x . Assume rst that the outputs of the rst round have di erence . The inputs to the third round di er in only two bits both a ecting only S-box 1. According to the above discussion, the inputs with di erence X to the fourth round are equal in the inputs to the S-boxes 1 and 7. Therefore eight bits of the di erence Y are zero. Since the di erence of the inputs to the third round is known, the attacker knows eight bits of the di erence of the outputs of the F-function in the sixth round, since he knows the di erence in the ciphertexts. These eight bits are the output bits of S-boxes 1 and 7. The attacker now tries for all 64 possible values of the key whether the inputs to S-box 1 yield the computed expected output di erence, and does the same for S-box 7. For every pair of ciphertexts used in the analysis for both S-boxes the attacker will get an average of 4 suggested key values, among which the right key values 16 ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( F ? ? h ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( F ? ? h ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( F ? ? h ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( appear, since the used di erential has probability one. By trying a few pairs, e.g. four pairs with a high probability only one key value, the right key value, will be left suggested by all pairs.
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In the following, let K i;j denote the six bit key in S-box no. j in the i'th round and let P be the 32 bit linear permutation in the DES round function, see 9] . 'j' and 'k' denotes concatenation of 4 bit and 32 bit strings respectively.
We assumed above that the di erence of the outputs of the rst round is , which it will not always be. First we note that since the inputs to the rst round di er in the inputs to only one S-box, there are only 16 possible values of . Choose a set of 4 plaintexts P i = A i k P R for i = 0; :::; 3; where A i = P(a i j r 0 j r 1 j :::jr 5 j r 6 ), where a i = i, each of 4 bits, the r k 's are randomly chosen 4 bit numbers and P R is a randomly chosen 32 bit string. Next choose a set of 4 plaintexts By combining each of the four plaintexts P i with each of the four plaintexts P 1;j one obtains one pair of plaintexts with di erence P(h x j 0 j 0 j 0 j 0 j 0 j 0 j 0) k 1;1 (1) for all values of h = 0; :::; f x , that is, from these eight plaintexts one pair of plaintexts is a right pair with respect to the characteristic in Fig. 2 .
To get more right pairs choose a set of 4 plaintexts P 2;j = B j k P R 1;2 for j = 0; :::; 3; where 1;2 = 40000000 x , and a set of 4 plaintexts P 3;j = A i k P R 1;1 1;2 for i = 0; :::; 3. By combining the set P 2;j with the set P 3;j one obtains another pair of plaintexts with di erence (1) for all values of h = 0; :::; f x .
By combining the set P 1;j with the set P 2;j and combining the set P i with the set P 3;j one obtains 2 pairs of plaintexts with di erence P(h x j 0 j 0 j 0 j 0 j 0 j 0 j 0) k 1;2 for all values of h = 0; :::; f x . Note that the characteristics just de ned both a ect the same S-box in the rst round. Get the encryptions of the 16 plaintexts P i ; P 1;j ; P 2;j and P 3;j .
The attack proceeds as follows. 1. For every value k 1;1 of the key K 1;1 in S-box 1 in the rst round do (a) Let k 1; be the 48 bit key obtained from the concatenation of the value of k 1;1 and 42 randomly chosen bits. Compute c 0 = F(k 1; ; P R ) and c 1 = F(k 1; ; P R 1;1 ). Now 18 c 0 c 1 = P(y j 0 j 0 j ::: j 0) for some hex value y. Find the plaintext P i and P 1;j , such that c 0 c 1 = A i B j . The pair of plaintexts P i and P 1;j is a right pair with respect to the characteristic in Fig. 2 . Next compute c 2 = F(k 1; ; P R 1;2 ) and c 3 = F(k 1; ; P R 1;1 1;2 ). Find the plaintext P 2;j and P 3;j , such that c 2 c 3 = B j A i . The pair of plaintexts P 2;j and P 3;j is a right pair with respect to the characteristic in Fig. 2 . Repeat this procedure nding 2 right pairs P i and P 2;j , P 1;j and P 3;j for the second characteristic. (b) Use the four right pairs in the di erential attack described above. First do the attack on S-box 1 in the last round. If one key value k 6;1 of K 6;1 is suggested by all four pairs, perform the di erential attack on S-box 7 in the last round. If one key value k 6;7 of K 6;7 is suggested by all four pairs, take k 6;1 and k 6;7 as the key values of K 6;1 and K 6;7 and take k 1;1 as the value of K 1;1 . The above attack nds 18 key bits with a high probability. In step 1(a) above we need not do a complete evaluation of the F-function, only the computation of the one S-box involved is needed. For every value of K 1;1 we do 4 S-box evaluations. Then for every value of K 6;1 we do 8 S-box evaluations, one for each of the 8 ciphertexts in the 4 pairs. The search for K 6;7 is done only when one key value of K 6;1 is suggested all four times. Totally the time used is about the time of 2 15 S-box evaluations, about the time of 500 encryptions of six round DES. Note that the di erential used in the attack has probability one. More key bits can be found in similar attacks by plaintexts yielding other characteristics.
With an additional 2 sets of each 16 plaintexts involving other Sboxes in the rst round one nds 54 key bits. By a careful choice of each of the 2 sets one of the plaintext P i in the above described attack can be reused. Since the DES has dependent round keys some of the key bits tried in the rst and in the sixth round are identical. Using the S-boxes 1, 2 and 5 in the rst round is an optimal choice and the attack nds 45 bits of the 56 bit secret key. The remaining 11 bits can be found by exhaustive search. The attack needs a total of 46 No. of chosen plaintexts No. of keybits found 7  8  16  18  31  33  46  45  Table 3 : Complexities of our attacks on DES with 6 rounds. plaintexts and runs in time about 3,500 encryptions of six round DES, which can be done in a few seconds on a PC.
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There are possible variations of the above attack, which are listed in Table 3 . It should be noted that the linear attack combined with di erential 'techniques' by Hellman and Langford 4] exploits the same phenomenon as in our attack, but the two attacks are di erent. Finally we note that in 10] Preneel et al. considered, what they call reduced exors, in di erential attacks on the DES in CFB mode. The reduced exors have some resemblance with partial di erentials.
Higher order di erentials of the DES
In this section we consider higher order di erentials for the 8 S-boxes of the DES. Table 4 lists the probabilities of the most likely n'th order di erentials for the 8 S-boxes of the DES, for n = 1; :::; 4: Note that the probability of any fth order di erential is one, since the output coordinates of the DES S-boxes have order 5 (see 11] ) and the fth derivative is a constant according to Prop. 4.2. The numbers for S-box 4 in Table 4 are substantially di erent from the numbers of the other S-boxes and there exist 3. order di erentials with probability one. For example with 1 = 25 x , 2 = 24 x and 3 = 30 x the third order di erential of S-box 4, 1 ; 2 ; 3 (S4) = f x with probability one. Note that 1 ; 2 ; 3 (S4) is the exclusive-or of eight six bit inputs. We have found no way of exploiting higher order di erentials for the DES, other than by attacking a four round version of the DES. However since the DES with four rounds is trivially broken using rst order di erentials, this application is not of much use.
S-box no. 1. order 2. order 3. order 4. order  1  16  24  48  64  2  16  28  48  64  3  16  28  40  64  4  16  48  64  64  5  16  28  40  64  6  16  24  40  64  7  16  28  40  64  8  16  28  40  64  Table 4 : The probabilities ( 64) of the best higher order di erential s for the 8 S-boxes of DES. 6 Computing the Nonlinear Order In 11] it was considered to cryptanalyse the DES by the method of formal coding. The conclusion was that this is hardly possible. It was shown also that the nonlinear order of any of the 8 S-boxes in the DES is 5. An open question is, what is the order of the outputs for the full 16 round DES. In general, a cipher will be vulnerable to attacks like the method of formal coding if the nonlinear order of the outputs is too low. Higher order di erentials can be used to determine a lower bound of the nonlinear order of a block cipher.
Test for nonlinear order
If in step (3), y 1 6 = y 2 then the nonlinear order is greater than i according to Prop. 4.3. If y 1 = y 2 then the nonlinear order may be greater than i, because it is possible for other values of x 0 1 and x 0 2 that y 0 1 6 = y 0 2 . However the above test must stop, since if the i'th derivative of f is constant, then the i + r'th derivative of f is zero for all r > 0. Also, note that computing an i'th order derivative of f, is equivalent to computing two times an i?1'st order derivative of f. Therefore the values of y 1 ; y 2 can be stored and re-used in following steps.
To test a block cipher E, pick a random key K and two random plaintexts and run the test for nonlinear order. If the output of the test is d then the nonlinear order of E K is at least d. Repeat this procedure for as many keys and plaintexts as desired. The input r and the test in step (4) is necessary for block ciphers like the DES and r should be chosen not much greater than 32, since it takes about 2 r encryptions to check a nonlinear order of r.
Concluding Remarks
We have shown applications for partial and higher order di erentials. We presented ciphers secure against conventional di erential attacks, but vulnerable to attacks using either partial or higher order di erentials. We showed interesting partial and higher order di erentials for the DES and presented a di erential attack on DES with 6 rounds using partial di erentials with complexity of about 46 chosen plaintexts and a running time of about the time of 3,500 encryptions. Finally we presented a method to test the nonlinear order of a block cipher using higher order di erentials.
In the above attacks we have exploited the small number of rounds in the Feistel ciphers we have analysed. It is an open problem, whether di erential attacks based on higher order di erentials are applicable to ciphers with more than 5 rounds. This seems to require a method of iterating higher order di erentials to more than two rounds in the same way as with rst order di erentials. Partial di erentials can be combined with conventional di erentials to re ne attacks using the latter. It is an open problem whether partial di erentials can improve the attacks on DES 1, 2] for more than 6 rounds.
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